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Abstract—The lack of any sender authentication mechanism
in place makes Controller Area Network (CAN) vulnerable to
security threats. For instance, an attacker can impersonate an
Electronic Control Unit (ECU) on the bus and send spoofed
messages unobtrusively with the identifier of the impersonated
ECU. To address this problem, we propose a novel sender authen-
tication technique that uses power consumption measurements
of the ECU to authenticate the sender of a message. When an
ECU is transmitting, its power requirement is affected, and a
characteristic pattern appears in its power consumption. Our
technique exploits the power consumption of each ECU during
the transmission of a message to determine whether the message
actually originated from the purported sender. We evaluate our
approach in both a lab setup and a real vehicle. We also evaluate
our approach against factors that can impact the power consump-
tion measurement of the ECUs. The results of the evaluation
show that the proposed technique is applicable in a broad range
of operating conditions with reasonable computational power
requirements and attaining good accuracy.
Index Terms—Embedded systems security, automotive systems,
controller area network, sender authentication, side-channel
analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Controller Area Network (CAN) is a communication proto-
col widely used in automotive systems for efficient real-time
applications. However, its design exhibits significant security
limitations. Among the most important of these limitations
is the lack of sender authentication. Attackers can exploit
any vulnerabilities in, e.g., the connectivity of automobile
systems to infiltrate Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and
inject spoofed messages on the network. Perhaps, the security
of the CAN protocol may not have been of such paramount
importance back when the protocol came into existence in
1993. However, in recent decades security has become a
critical aspect in automotive systems, given the increase in
complexity and connectivity of modern vehicles [1].
Given the insecure nature of the CAN bus, there has
been a growing interest amongst the researchers to study the
security of in-vehicle communication systems. For instance,
Checkoway et al. [2] and Koscher et al. [3] demonstrate the
potential vulnerabilities in automotive systems by studying and
exploiting various attack vectors, including remote wireless
connectivity such as Bluetooth, cellular, and DSRC . The
work by Miller and Valasek [4], [5] highlights the lack of
authentication as one of the critical aspects of CAN networks.
They exploited the radio connectivity of the infotainment
unit to hijack its functionality and send messages to other
ECUs. The compromised unit impersonates ECUs involved in
the control of critical physical attributes of the vehicle. This
allowed them to demonstrate a remote attack that disrupts or
hijacks the functionality of systems such as the engine, the
brakes, and the steering. Moreover, dedicated websites have
materialized providing procedures and guidelines for CAN bus
hacking and reverse engineering of vehicles [6] for some of
the major vehicle manufacturers.
A. Problem Statement
From the discussion above, it is evident that the inability of
CAN bus to authenticate the sender represents one of its most
important security shortcomings. This leads us to the problem
that motivates our work, which can be stated as: given a mes-
sage being transmitted on a CAN bus, determine whether the
message originated from the purported sender. Furthermore, if
the message did not originate from the purported sender, then
determine the actual sender of the message.
B. Related Work
Several approaches have been proposed in the past for
sender authentication in the CAN protocol. The solutions
can be broadly categorized into two categories: message
authentication using cryptographic techniques and authentica-
tion based on fingerprinting of physical characteristics of the
transmissions.
Researchers have used traditional cryptographic techniques
for message authentication [7], [8], [9] by including secret key
as part of the CAN frames to prevent forgery. However, the
use of these techniques is restricted due to the limited size
(8 bytes) of the CAN frames and strict timing constraints in
operation.
Fingerprinting techniques build upon side-channel analysis,
or more in general, analysis of physical characteristics of the
transmission. One such approach [10] uses the clock skew of
the periodically transmitted messages for intrusion detection.
The method exploits the fact that the crystal clocks of the
devices are not synchronized with each other resulting in a
time deviation that is unique and stable over time and used
as the ECU identifier. One of the limitations of the approach
is that the technique does not work with aperiodic messages.
Furthermore, the work by Sagong et al. [11] demonstrates that
2the method can be defeated by profiling and reproducing the
timing patterns of the target ECU.
Murvay and Groza [12] devised a fingerprinting approach
that uses voltage variations to fingerprint the ECUs for sender
authentication. This approach applies only to the voltage
measured on a low-speed CAN bus, while vehicles today
operate at varying speeds from 10Kbps to 1Mbps depending
on complexity and functionality. To overcome this limitation,
Choi et al. [13] proposed an approach that generates ECU
fingerprints from voltage measurement using both time and
frequency domain features and used a supervised classification
algorithm for sender authentication. Although the approach
detected transmitter with improved accuracy, the method has
a practical limitation that the measurements are collected at
an extremely high sampling rate (2.5Gsps), and it works with
a fixed message format.
Cho et al. [14] developed a model for sender identifica-
tion by fingerprinting the ECUs using voltage measurements
against dominant bits of the transmissions. Kneib and Huth
proposed Scission [15], an ECU profiling technique that builds
upon the idea of Viden for sender authentication. Scission
relies on the use of all the transmission bits instead of just the
dominant bits to construct ECU profile. Similarly to [10], this
technique relies on physical characteristics that conceivably
could be profiled and imitated by a different device. Moreover,
they could potentially be affected through access to subsystems
outside the device implementing the technique, as shown
by [16]. We do acknowledge that any such attacks would
require temporary physical access to the target CAN, to add
a custom device on the network.
Two recent works [17], [18] propose techniques for sender
authentication on a CAN network based on similar underlying
ideas: determine the physical location of the sender based on
the propagation time of the signal as it travels through the
CAN bus. Though the techniques do exhibit some important
advantages, the works are feasibility studies. Moreover, the
techniques still suffer the limitation that an attacker can
potentially defeat it with temporary physical access to the
target CAN bus.
C. Contribution
In this work, we propose CANOA, a novel technique for
sender authentication using power consumption measurements
of ECUs as identifying characteristics. Power consumption
measurements leak relevant and critical information about the
sequence of operations executed in the ECUs [19]. Specif-
ically, we exploit the correlation between the power con-
sumption of each ECU and its state (transmitting or not
transmitting). From the power consumption measurements for
all the ECUs, CANOA determines the actual sender when a
transmission is observed on the bus (with a purported sender in
its data), which constitutes an effective sender authentication
mechanism. One key and unique advantage of CANOA is
that the classification is based on physical characteristics of
the transmitting ECU that are guaranteed to be non-clonable.
We can see that this is the case, given the strict relationship
between ECUs activity (in particular, transmitting vs. not
transmitting) and their power consumption patterns: if an ECU
E is not transmitting, it is physically impossible for another
ECU to make the power consumption of E exhibit the same
pattern it does when it is transmitting. We observe that one
condition for our technique to be effective is that the power
consumption patterns when transmitting and not transmitting,
and even while receiving, must not only be different: the
difference should be large enough for the patterns to be
distinguishable. This is one aspect that the results of this study
confirm.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose and implement CANOA, a technique for
sender authentication using power consumption charac-
teristics of transmitting and non-transmitting states of the
ECUs.
• We show the applicability of CANOA in practical settings
by evaluating our proposed approach for sender authen-
tication in a lab setup and a real vehicle.
• Lastly, we demonstrate the feasibility and technical via-
bility of CANOA by studying the impact of the variations
in bus speed, message format and source code on the
accuracy of the CANOA.
D. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II gives a background on the related concepts followed
by proposed technique in Section III. Section V describes the
setup and results of experimental evaluation, followed by a
brief discussion and suggested future work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides some background on concepts related
to our work. We briefly describe some aspects of the CAN
bus that is used in automotive systems, power-based program
tracing or monitoring, and machine learning-based models.
A. Controller Area Network
Controller Area Network (CAN) uses a broadcast topology
where multiple nodes (Electronic Control Units (ECUs)) can
connect and exchange data [20]. The physical layer of CAN is
a twisted-pair cable for serial communication using differential
signalling. The operation of the CAN bus at the physical
layer is based on “open-collector” or “open-drain” connected
devices, implementing a “wired AND” connection. Any device
can, without causing any conflict or short-circuit on the bus,
assert a logical 0 on the bus, independently of what any other
module is transmitting. Releasing the bus implicitly brings it
to a logical 1, provided that no other device is asserting a
logical 0.
The devices themselves arbitrate access to the bus. To this
end, a priority field is used, the ID field, as illustrated in
Figure 1. The figure and our discussion are limited to the 11-
bit base frame, which is the most commonly used CAN frame
format. However, we emphasize that our proposed technique
operates equally effectively with either 11-bit IDs or with the
extended frame 29-bit IDs. Lower values for this ID represent
3higher priority, and devices read back the state of the bus to
detect collisions: if a device transmitting a 1 as part of the ID
field reads the bus and observes a logical 0, then it concludes
that some other module of higher priority is transmitting, so
it releases the bus. This is the case since the ID is transmitted
MSB to LSB.
Additional Fields
ID FieldStart of Frame
(logical 0)
DATA
ID10 to ID0 CRC
Fig. 1. Simplified diagram of a CAN frame.
Additional issues related to the devices’ reaction to colli-
sions are not relevant to our work, so we omit any further
details. Every CAN frame includes a 15-bit Cyclic Redun-
dancy Check (CRC) field for fault-tolerance purposes— that
is, to protect the transmission from unintentional errors due
to noise or other artifacts at the hardware level. These may
include loose wires, defective or aged electronics, etc.
B. Power-Based Program Tracing or Monitoring
Based upon the field of side-channel analysis [19], power-
based program tracing or monitoring have appeared in the
literature in recent years [21], [22], [23], [24], [25]. Among
these, the earlier works ([21], [22]) propose the technique
as a means to reconstruct the program’s execution trace in
a deployed (uninstrumented) embedded device, although both
works mention other uses. [23], [24], [25] focus on observing
the power consumption of an embedded device to detect se-
curity attacks, following the rationale that such attacks would
cause the device to deviate from its normal operation. Moreno
and Fischmeister argue that this is an effective technique for
monitoring safety-critical embedded systems to enforce both
safety and security properties [26].
The basic idea is to exploit the relationship between a
device’s power consumption and its operation (more precisely,
what a processor is executing). By monitoring power consump-
tion, one can detect deviations from normal operation. This
can be done either by attempting an explicit reconstruction
of the program’s execution trace or simply through profiling
the power consumption patterns during normal operation and
detecting deviations from the profiled normal behaviour.
In our proposed technique, the use of power consumption
monitoring has a slightly different, yet closely related goal: we
are interested in exploiting the correlation between the power
consumption of ECUs and one aspect of the ECUs program’s
execution—whether the given ECU is transmitting on the
CAN bus. Though this leads to a more limited accomplishment
in terms of enforcing security, it has two important advantages:
(1) Our technique can detect attacks executed by a device
added to the system by an attacker with physical access (we
will discuss this aspect in more detail in Section III-A); and
(2) we can achieve a significantly higher accuracy compared
to existing power-based monitoring techniques (or similar
accuracy at much lower computational/processing power re-
quirements). This is the case because our system only needs
to reconstruct a feature that represents a much lower amount of
information, compared to reconstructing the complete execu-
tion trace or detecting minor deviations (or deviations during
a short amount of time) in the power consumption.
C. Machine Learning Based Classification
Classical supervised machine learning approach relies on
statistical pattern recognition to perform classification tasks.
Given a set of input observations {x1, x2, · · · , xR} ⊆ X
and a set of output class labels C = {C1, C2, · · · , CS}, the
goal of any statistical learning method is to learn a mapping
fˆ from input observations to output class labels, fˆ : X → C.
This mapping is an estimate of the true but unknown function
f that maps each input observation x to the class to which it
corresponds.
Typical classifier implementations rely on features extracted
from the observation x ∈ Rn for the operation where n is the
input dimension. For many applications, however, it is difficult
to identify the relevant features because of the complicated
nature of observations. One solution to this problem is to use a
dimensionality reduction technique to extract relevant features
in lower-dimensional space. Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [27] is a dimensionality reduction technique that seeks
to retain maximum variability in the input by projecting the
input to linear subspace. Features from the linear subspace can
be fed as input to a classifier and perform the classification
task. In our proposed technique, we use a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) [27] classifier for binary classification tasks.
SVM is a discriminative classification algorithm best suited for
high dimensional inputs. In this paper, we aim to detect the
state of an ECU during transmission by classifying a segment
of power consumption measurement of the ECU into the class
of transmission and non-transmission. And, a simple machine
learning algorithm such as an SVM is sufficient to serve the
purpose.
III. PROPOSED TECHNIQUE
This section presents the proposed technique CANOA for
sender authentication on a CAN network. We first describe
the attack model and assumptions, followed by the proposed
approach.
A. Attack Model and Assumptions
In our attack model, a target ECU is denoted ET, and it
represents the ECU that the attacker wants to impersonate.
That is, the attacker’s goal is to transmit messages with IDs
that correspond to ET. The purpose of such an attack may
be to cause some other ECU to operate on false data—data
that is logically correct but with contents that are under
the attacker’s control. For example, ET could be an ECU
connected to sensors, and an attacker could transmit false
temperature or speed data that could result in physical damage
to the transmission or the engine. Notice that this implies
that ET does not have any vulnerabilities that the attacker
4can exploit; for example, an ECU without any connectivity
to the Internet or mobile networks, when we consider remote
attackers.
An attacker is capable of sending crafted messages using
the ID of the ET in the following scenarios:
• Compromised ECU: In this scenario, an attacker gains
access to an ECU, denoted EC. Such compromised ECU
may be, for example, one with connectivity that exposes
some vulnerabilities to remote attackers, or exposes ser-
vices (e.g., open ports) that the designers of the vehicle
did not intend to offer (and are unaware that those
services are active and available).
• Added ECU: Our attack model includes an adversary
that may temporarily gain physical access to the vehicle
and the target CAN bus. Thus, they can attach an addi-
tional module, denoted EA, capable of transmitting CAN
messages to the existing network. This additional module
can be any arbitrary, custom hardware with firmware
entirely created by the attacker, thus capable of listening
and transmitting without any restrictions.
Figure 2 illustrates the above two attack vectors.
Additional ModuleTarget
CAN Bus
CompromisedTarget
CAN Bus
Fig. 2. Examples of attack scenarios on a CAN network. The dashed box in
the top figure shows the additional illegitimate module attached to the network
and boxes with solid lines are the legitimate ECUs on the network.
Our attack model also includes the possibility of an at-
tacker tampering with ongoing transmissions. In particular,
the malicious ECU (be it EC or EA) can hijack an ongoing
transmission from ECU E1 to change its ID and make it
look like the sender is ECU E2. We observe that this is
feasible given the “wired AND” nature of the CAN bus,
allowing an attacker to change any 1’s to 0’s in an ongoing
transmission. E1 will determine that a higher-priority frame is
being transmitted, and will withdraw from the bus; from that
point, the attacker can complete the transmission. Although
this attack does not affect CANOA’s ability to determine that
the sender is not E2, it may be beneficial for the attacker to
attempt to avoid detection by shifting the blame to E2.
Assumptions
Our proposed technique operates under the following as-
sumptions and limitations:
• Secure CANOA Implementation: We assume that
our proposed technique is implemented in a secure and
tamper-proof manner. In principle, we would expect the
module implementing our technique to be physically
isolated from any ECUs on the target CAN bus.
• No DoS: We assume that an attacker will not perform
a “brute” denial-of-service attack on the CAN bus. In
particular, if the attackers can place an arbitrary device,
they can certainly disrupt every transmission or even
assert a permanent logical 0 on the bus, effectively
severing all communications between any ECUs on that
bus. Though this sort of “trivial” attack seems powerful, it
will also be trivial to detect; the design of many vehicles
perhaps already includes safety mechanisms that would
appropriately deal with situations like this [28].
• Types of Attacks: Our proposed technique CANOA
concentrates on impersonation attacks. If a transmission
from an ECU EC contains malicious data but legitimate
ID (i.e., an ID that does correspond to EC), then our
system will not flag any anomalies or suspected attacks.
Furthermore, our method does not detect if a new source
address appears on the network; however, this is an easy
intrusion to detect.
B. Proposed Approach
In this section, we explain the technique to verify the sender
of a message given the power consumption measurements of
the ECUs on the bus. Let E = {E1, E2, · · · , EK} be a
set of K ECUs. Let S = {S1, S2, · · · , SK} be a set of
K source addresses. A source address is unique to a sender;
however, an ECU may generate messages with more than
one source address where the source address of a message
can be derived from the ID of the message. Let Pk ∈ R
L
represent a vector of power consumption measurements of
length L from ECU Ek. Let a decoded transmission be
represented by a tuple (t, S) where t represents the start time
of the transmission, and S denotes the source address of the
transmission. Let a set of K classification models be denoted
by F = {f1, f2, · · · , fK}. Let an estimate of the transmission
window be denoted by τ , corresponding to the amount of
time during which transmission is observed on the bus. We
will use the term power trace to refer to a segment of power
consumption measurement of length τ . Notice that a power
trace may contain power consumption measurements during a
time interval where the ECU was not transmitting.
1) Generating features of transmissions: In this section,
we describe the method to construct features of transmissions
using power consumption measurements of the ECUs. As the
first step towards the implementation of CANOA, we capture
analog voltage signal and power consumption measurements
of the ECUs. From the captured voltage signal, we decode
the times of occurrences and source addresses of the trans-
missions. We also calculate an estimate of the transmission
window (τ ), which is equal to the mean of transmission
windows corresponding to N decoded transmissions. Using
5the power consumption measurements from the ECUs and the
decoded transmissions, we construct features of the decoded
transmissions, which is used as training data for the ECU state
identification model implementation.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the steps for the construction
of the feature vectors from transmissions using power con-
sumption measurements of the ECUs. The input to the al-
gorithm is a set of power consumption measurements from
the ECUs, P , a sequence of decoded transmissions T .
The output generated by the algorithm is a set of pairs
{(X1,y1), (X2,y2), · · · , (XK ,yK)} where Xk ∈ R
N×M is
a matrix of N feature vectors of length M and yk is an array
of the source addresses corresponding to the transmissions for
ECU Ek . As a preprocessing step, we first normalize the power
consumption measurements from the ECUs. This is done to
unify the scale of the power consumption measurements from
different ECUs to a common scale. In the algorithm, in the
expression for normalization, Pk and sk are the estimates of
mean and the standard deviation of a sample of power signal
from the ECU Ek. The normalization of power signals is
followed by generating features from transmissions as follows:
For a transmission (t, S) and an ECU, Ek , fetch the power
trace Pk[τ ] corresponding to the ECUs Ek starting with the
time t for the length of the transmission window τ . To the
extracted segment of power signal, we apply a windowing
called Tukey window [29]. The Tukey window method helps
reduce the amplitude of discontinuities at the boundaries of
the segment by multiplying it with a finite-legth window
with an amplitude that varies smoothly and gradually toward
zero at the edges. This is followed by applying Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) to the windowed segment of power-trace.
This helps recognize and eliminate the frequency componenets
that are predominantly noise. This is followed by computing
the PCA of the resultant power trace in the frequency domain
to filter out the frequency compoennts which posses most of
the variance in the segment, and concatenating the first M
principal components of the PCA, which form the feature
vector x for the transmission (t, S) with the decoded source
address y as the label.
2) Model Implementation: To perform sender authenti-
cation, we implement a set of binary (transmission/non-
transmission) classification models separately for all the source
addresses observed on the CAN bus. As a source address
uniquely identifies an ECU on the bus, the model per source
address acts as a sender state identifier, and hence, a sender
authenticator. Even if multiple source addresses are associated
with an ECU, the fact that only one ECU transmits at a time,
thus, the non-overlapping features of transmission and non-
transmission for the ECUs helps in identifying the correct state
of the ECU. The model implementation is subdivided into two
stages: training and classification.
• Training: For every (Ek, Sk) where Sk is mapped to
the ECU Ek, we train a classifier fk : Xk → R
2 that
maps the set of features of transmission to a vector of
probabilities, which signifies the strength of the classifier
in the class of transmission (1) and non-transmission (0).
The training data (Xk,yk) comprises of a labelled set
of extracted features of trasnmissions from Ek where an
Algorithm 1 Generate Power Traces
Require: P ∈ RK×L, T : a set N of transmissions, E : a set
of K ECUs, τ : transmission window
1: function POWERTRACES(T ,P , E)
2: X ← 0 ⊲ Initialize a set of K N ×M matrices
3: Y ← 0 ⊲ Initialize a set of K N -dimensional vectors
4: P∗ ←
Pk −Pk
sk
, 1 6 k 6 K ⊲ Normalize P
5: for all Ek ∈ E do
6: for n← 1 to N do ⊲ Iterate T
7: x← P ∗
k
[t : (t+ τ)]
8: x← Apply Tukey Window(x)
9: x← Apply FFT(x)
10: x← Apply PCA(x)
11: Xk[n]← x[0 : M ]
12: yk[n]← S
13: end for
14: end for
15: return (X ,Y)
16: end function
example x ∈ Xk is labelled as one (or, to the class
of transmission) if the trasnmission was observed with
source address Sk; otherwise, the example is labelled as
zero (or, to the class of non-transmission because the
transmission is observed with the source address from
the set S \ Sk which are not mapped to Ek). In other
words, the class of transmission contains features of
transmissions with the source address Sk from the ECU
Ek; whereas, the class of non-transmission contains fea-
tures of transmissions with other source addresses S \Sk
from the ECU Ek. Using the prepared training set, we
train the model until convergence; that is until the error
between the predicted and the true class approaches a
specific threshold, ǫ. At convergence, CANOA generates
a trained classifier, fk, which can be used for predicting
the probability of transmission from source address Sk.
• Classification: As transmission is observed with only one
source address on CAN bus, only one model fk ∈ F from
amongst the models F will report the highest probability
of transmission. The (Ek, Sk) corresponding to the model
fk that reports the highest probability of transmission
is the actual source of the transmission. During clas-
sification, for every new decoded transmission (t, S),
CANOA determines the transmitting state of each of the
ECU Ek ∈ E by feeding the features of transmission
calculated at time t to the models fk ∈ F . We apply
an activation function called softmax to the vector of
the probability of transmissions from the models so that
the output vector sums to one, a property essential for
retaining the probabilistic nature of the output. Based on
the prediction probabilities of the models, an outcome
of 1 is assigned to the source address Sk for which
the corresponding model’s likelihood of transmission is
greater than a predefined threshold δ, and is greater than
that of all the other model’s predictions. And an outcome
of 0 is assigned for all the other source addresses S \Sk.
6C. Attack Detection
In this section, we describe how to use the model classifica-
tion result to detect the attack give the attack model explained
in Section III-A. Given a transmission T = (t, S) with the
start time of transmission t and S as the source address of
the message in transmission, CANOA identifies the purported
sender EP of the transmission, and uses the power trace of
EP as input to the classifier to determine whether EP is
the source of transmission. Based on the prediction, CANOA
determines whether the transmission constitutes an attempted
impersonation attack.
• Detection of Impersonation Attacks: Consider a trans-
mission from some ECU attempting to impersonate some
other ECU. The purported sender EP in that transmission
corresponds to the target ECU ET being impersonated.
Since EP is not transmitting at that time, the model HP
outputs 0, indicating that the message does not originate
at EP. This contradiction reveals the presence of an
attempted impersonation attack.
• Detection of Compromised ECUs: Upon detection of
an intrusion and depending on the attack model, either
an ECU on the network is compromised, or an additional
illegitimate module is attached to the network. If the
transmission originated from a compromised ECU EC,
then the model will not predict EP as the source of the
transmission. However, there will most certainly exist
an ECU on the network for which the corresponding
model will output a 1. In other words, the features of
transmissions of one of the ECUs at time u will closely
match the previously observed features of transmissions
from the corresponding ECU.
To detect EC, CANOA constructs the features of trans-
missions using power traces for all the ECUs at time t
except the purported source EP, that is, E \{EP}. Given
the power traces of the ECUs, CANOA iterates over all
the Ek ∈ E \ {EP} and perform model classification
to determine whether transmission originated from Ek.
The ECU Ek for which the corresponding model Hk
output is a 1 is reported as the true source of the
transmission T . This reported source ECU is also flagged
as compromised.
• Detection of additional ECUs: If the impersonating
transmission originated from an additional illegitimate
device that was added to the network by an attacker, then
every model Hk will output 0. This indicates that none
of the legitimate ECUs actually transmitted, implying the
presence of an additional device on the network which
sent the message.
D. CANOA-Aware Attacker
In this section, we argue that even if an attacker is aware
of the functionality of CANOA, it is still difficult for them
to mount a successful impersonation attack. The attacker will
use their knowledge about CANOA to influence compromised
ECU power characteristics, PC to match that of the target ECU
power characteristics, PT. However, the distinction between
transmitting and non-transmitting states of an ECU is most
likely determined by the I/O required to transmit. And virtually
all ECUs use a hardware-based CAN controller to transmit,
and have no physical means to transmit any other way. Thus,
the attacker will be unable to do anything to cancel the
inevitable power consumption profile that the CAN controller
exhibits when transmitting.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we give a brief overview of the setup for
capturing CAN transmissions and power consumption mea-
surements from the ECUs. For the prototype implementation
of CAN, we connected four Keil MCB1700 boards to a CAN
bus. With each board containing a CAN controller, transceiver
and a receiver providing the board with the capability to send
and receive CAN messages with a bus speed of 125 kbps. We
supplied the boards with the same power source to ensure
the minimum introduction of noise in the power consumption
pattern. Using the setup, we captured a differential voltage
signal from the bus and power consumption measurements
from the boards using a Digitizer with a sampling rate of
10Msps.
For the implementation of the technique in a practical
setting, we deployed custom hardware in compliance with
the security and warranty of the vehicle components ensuring
minimal modification at the hardware level. Using the equip-
ment, we captured CAN transmissions on the bus operating
at 250 kbps, and power consumption measurements from the
ECUs with a sampling rate of 10Msps.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed technique for
sender authentication in a prototype setting and a sterling
truck. We also show that the proposed approach applies to
different bus configurations.
A. Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the performance of CANOA for sender au-
thentication, we report confusion matrix accuracy measures.
However, different evaluation metrics examine various aspects
of the experimental results. For instance, results of sender
authentication for a given transmission might show varying
results when evaluated on different metrics. Therefore, we
assess the performance of the proposed technique for sender
authentication with different bus configurations using the met-
rics of precision, recall, accuracy and F-measure. Precision
rightly captures the false positives of the system by calculating
the number of true positives (TP) over the number of true pos-
itives (TP) plus the number of false positives (FP). Whereas,
recall reports the relevance of the system by calculating the
number of true positives (TP) over the number of true positives
(TP) plus the number of false negatives (FN). Accuracy is the
ratio of correctly predicted sources for the messages to the
total number of messages. And, F-measure is used to measure
the similarity between the predicted state and true state by
calculating the weighted average between precision and recall.
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With a prototype setup of the CAN network, we evalu-
ated the accuracy of CANOA for sender authentication. The
transmissions in the prototype were observed from five source
addresses corresponding to the five MCB1700 boards repre-
sented as five ECUs. We captured and decoded the start time
and the source address of 5 k CAN transmissions observed
on the bus. Using the decoded transmissions and the power
consumption measurements of the ECUs, we constructed
features of transmissions for the five ECUs using an estimate
of the transmission window τ to be equal to 1.02ms. Each
feature vector in the extracted features of transmissions had
no of features,M = 50, thus, generating a set of five matrices
for the five ECUs of size 25 000× 50. Using the mapping for
the ECUs and the source addresses, we prepared the dataset for
training and testing for the following combinations of ECUs
and source addresses: (ECU1, SA1), (ECU2, SA2), (ECU3,
SA3), (ECU4, SA4), and (ECU5, SA5) where SA1 maps to
ECU1, SA2 maps to ECU, and so forth. For the mapping
(ECU1, SA1), we prepared training and test set where the
class of transmissions consisted of the extracted features of
transmissions from ECU1 where the source address was SA1,
and the classes of non-transmission consisted of the extracted
features of transmissions from ECU1 where the source address
was not SA1. Similarly, for the mapping (ECU2, SA2), the
training examples with the class of transmissions comprised of
features of transmissions from ECU2 where the source address
was SA2, and the examples of non-transmissions comprised of
features of transmissions from ECU2 where the source address
was not SA2. Similarly, we prepared training and test sets
for the rest of the source address and ECU mappings. For
model implementation, we split the training sets into balanced
chunks (equal no of examples for the class of transmission and
non-transmission) of training and cross-validation such that for
each of the (ECU, SA) pairs, 70% of the training examples
are reserved for training and 30% for cross-validation. Using
the training and validation splits, we trained linear SVMs for
the five source addresses. The models finished training on the
training examples with an average training time of 30 minutes.
1) Evaluation: In Figure 3, we report the accuracies of
the five binary classifiers. The figure shows the box plots
of the model accuracies obtained using bootstrapping during
training and validation. Based on the figure, it is evident that
the accuracy of the model for (ECU4, SA4) has relatively
less variance (with less spread within and outside the box)
as compared to the other models. On the other hand, the
model for (ECU5, SA5) has most variance with a minimum
achievable accuracy of 99.25% and a maximum accuracy of
99.98%. The large variance in the model accuracy is due to
the presence of noise in the extracted features of transmissions.
Overall, the subtle difference in the model accuracies across
all the combinations shows that the technique is effective in
the authentication of the sender of the message with an average
accuracy of 99.87%.
In Figure I, we show the accuracy of the models to authen-
ticate senders using the confusion matrix on the test set of 1 k
transmissions. For every transmission in the test set, we obtain
a vector of the probability of transmissions from each of the
models, which signifies the confidence of the models in the
class of transmission. Using the probability vectors of the test
set of transmissions, we obtain the confusion matrix. From the
figure, we observe that the models authenticate senders of the
transmissions accurately with a false positive rate of 0.0001.
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Fig. 3. Models accuracies for a combination of ECUs and source addresses
for the lab setup
C. Real Vehicle
We evaluated our proposed sender authentication approach
in a sterling acterra truck. In the truck, we observed messages
on the CAN bus with three source addresses: 0, 11, and 15. Of
the three source addresses, transmissions with source address
0 and 15 were observed from Engine and transmissions with
source address 11 was observed from Anti-Lock Brake System
(ABS). For the evaluation, we captured and decoded a total
of 30 k CAN transmissions. Alongside this, we also captured
the power consumption measurements of Engine and ABS
from the vehicle in a stationary position. The only difference
observed in the power consumption measurements of the
stationary vehicle from the moving vehicle is the change in the
noise floor, which the model learned to ignore over training it-
erations. Out of the 30 k transmissions, 10 k transmissions each
triggered with source address 0, 11, and 15. Using the decoded
transmissions and the power consumption measurements of
the ECUs, we constructed features of transmissions for the
three ECUs of the size 30 000× 50 each using the value of τ
equal to 0.65ms andM = 50 principal components. Using the
features, we prepared datasets for the following combinations
of ECUs and source addresses: (ECM, 0), (ECM, 15), and
(ABS, 11) where source address 0 and 15 are mapped to
ECM (the Engine), and source address 11 is mapped to ABS.
For source address 0, the class of transmissions comprised of
features of transmissions from ECU with the source address
0 and the class of non-transmission comprised of extracted
features of transmissions from Engine with source addresses
11. Similarly, the dataset for source address 11 comprised
of examples with the class of transmissions, which consisted
of features of transmissions from ABS with source address
11 and the examples with the class of non-transmissions
containing features of transmissions from ABS with source
8TABLE I
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR SENDER AUTHENTICATION IN A PROTOTYPE SETTING
(ECU1, SA1) (ECU2, SA2) (ECU3, SA3) (ECU4, SA4) (ECU5, SA5)
(ECU1, SA1) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(ECU2, SA2) 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(ECU3, SA3) 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00
(ECU4, SA4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
(ECU5, SA5) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
address 0 and 15. Similarly, the dataset for source address 15
is prepared.
Similar to the lab setup, we split the prepared datasets into
training, cross-validation, and test set in the ratio of 6 : 2 : 2
for the evaluation. Using the training and validation splits for
the three combinations of source addresses and ECUs pairs,
we implemented linear SVM using the technique described in
Section III-B2. The models finished training on the training
examples with an average training time of 30 minutes.
1) Qualitative Evaluation: We visualized the prepared fea-
tures of transmissions, and non-transmissions for the source
address 0, 11, and 15. For visualization, we obtain the non-
linear transformations of the features of transmissions and
non-transmission for all the source addresses using tSNE.
tSNE [27] is a tool to visualize high-dimensional data by
projecting to a low-dimensional non-linear subspace. Figure 4
shows the scatter plots of the first two components of the tSNE
transformations of the features for all the source addresses.
The figures also show the t-scores and p-values of the features
of source addresses. The t-score is a measure to tell apart
the difference between the features of transmissions and the
features of non-transmissions; thus, the higher the t-score
value, the larger the differences. And the p-value determines
the significance of t-scores. A small p-value (typically 6 0.05)
provides strong evidence for the significance of the t-score.
Based on the t-score and p-values of the features for the source
addresses, it is evident that the characteristics of transmission
are significantly different from the characteristics of non-
transmissions, and hence, can be used for the identification
of the state of the ECUs during a transmission.
2) Quantitative Evaluation: We report the accuracies of
the three binary classification models using bootstrapping.
Figure 3 shows the box plots of the model accuracies. Based
on the figure, it is evident that the accuracy of the model for
(ECM, 0) has relatively less variance (with less spread within
and outside the box) as compared to the other models. On the
other hand, the model for source address 11 mapped to ABS
has the most variance with a minimum achievable accuracy
of 95.25% and a maximum accuracy of 98.62%. The large
variance in the model accuracy is due to the presence of noise
in the power consumption measurements of ABS, which gets
propagated in the extracted features. Overall, the technique is
effective in the sender authentication of CAN transmissions
with an average accuracy of 99.87%.
We evaluate the model classification accuracy on a test
set of transmissions from Sterling Acterra using a confusion
matrix. Similar to the lab setup, we calculate the confusion
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Fig. 4. Scatter plots showing the tSNE components of the power traces of
Engine during transmissions with source address 0, 11, and 15 in frequecy
domain.
matrix using the predicted probabilities of transmissions of
the models for each of the transmissions in the test set. From
9Table III, we observe that some transmissions with source
address 0 are misclassified as 15, and vice versa resulting in
a drop in the overall accuracy. This is the case because the
two source address belongs to the engine ECU, and hence,
have similar power characteristics of transmissions. However,
the misclassifications among source addresses, which belong
to the same ECU will still be able to identify the transmitting
state of the ECU correctly and hence, identify the sender of
the message accurately. Furthermore, the response time for
sender authentication in the truck is noted to be an average of
0.8ms, which makes the technique feasible for application in
real-time settings.
Additional Module Detection: To test the model for the
detection of an additional device (spoofed transmissions),
we injected spoofed messages on the bus with the source
address 0 using a Kvaser tool [30] and captured 1000 spoofed
transmissions. We evaluated CANOA for sender authentication
of the spoofed transmissions along with regular transmissions
from the Engine and the ABS by reporting the confusion
matrix in two variables: attack and normal. A value of one
is assigned to the variable attack if none of the source address
based model’s predicted probability of transmission value is
greater than δ, indicating that the transmission is a spoofed
transmission; otherwise, a zero is assigned indicating the
transmission is a regular transmission. And a value of one is
assigned to normal if atleast one of the source address based
model’s predicted probability of trasnmission value is greater
than δ and greater than all the other model’s probability value
indicating the transmission is not spoofed; otherwise a zero is
assigned. From the Table II, it is evident that all the spoofed
transmissions are flagged by the technique; thus, indicating the
effectiveness of the technique in sender authentication.
TABLE II
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR ATTACK DETECTION IN A STERLING ACTERRA
TRUCK
Normal Attack
Normal 0.99 0.00
Attack 0.00 1.0
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Fig. 5. Accuracy of models for a combination of ECUs and source addresses
TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR SENDER AUTHENTICATION IN A STERLING
ACTERRA TRUCK
(ECM, 0) (ECM, 15) (ABS, 15)
(ECM, 0) 0.99 0.01 0.00
(ECM, 15) 0.06 0.94 0.00
(ABS, 11) 0.00 0.00 0.99
D. Model Convergence
We evaluate the convergence of the trained SVM models
for sender state identification by plotting the learning curves
of the models. The learning curve shows the loss (inversely
proportional to the accuracy) of a model during training over
many iterations. A model is said to have converged if the
learning curve (including training and cross-validation curve)
increases at first over the iterations and then asymptotically
approaches a loss such that training any further has a negligible
improvement on the performance of the model. In particular,
we evaluate the learning curve of the models for the source
addresses 0, 11, and 15 from real-vehicle settings. From the
Figure 6, it is evident that the model begins to converge after
200 iterations across all the source addresses. In particular, the
learning curve for SA3 has a steep curve, which converges to
minimum achievable loss by as early as the 50th iteration
of validation, which is shown using black dotted line after
which point the standard deviation in the loss is negligible
(< 1). This is the case because, as shown in Figure 4(c),
the features of transmissions and non-transmissions for source
address 11 form two distinct clusters in the non-linear embed-
ding with less overlap as compared to the other two source
addresses. The convergence of the model allows a model to be
generalizable to unseen examples from the same distribution.
Thus, the models trained with examples from sterling acterra
corresponding to the transmissions captured over a timeframe
of fewer than 30 minutes indicates that the technique can
be applied in the truck for sender authentication of unseen
transmissions without losing accuracy.
E. Experimental Factors
Power consumed by an ECU is not immune to changes
in the bus parameters and other hardware configurations.
The variations introduced in the physical properties of the
CAN bus may manifest in the measured power consumption
measurements of the ECUs resulting in power traces that
deviate from the nominal power traces. The presence of
variations implies that the models should be updated upon
parameter changes. However, due to the complex structure of
the modern automobile system, it is not feasible to update
models upon every hardware or firmware update. Therefore,
we study the impact of the variations in parameters such as
bus speed, message format and embedded programs on the
power consumption measurements of the ECUs.
The factors and the corresponding levels against which we
evaluate the approach are as follows. Bus speed: 125 kbps,
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Fig. 6. Plots showing the learning curves of the SVM models for sender
state (transmitting/not transmitting) classification with source address 0, 11,
and 15.
250 kbps, and 500 kbps, Message format: standard (11-bit) and
extended (29-bit), embedded programs: uniform and heteroge-
neous. The selected levels of the bus configuration are found
in the majority of the modern automobile with 125 kbps used
for low-speed CAN communications and 500 kbps for high-
speed communications [20]. The two levels of the message
format are the only possible format of CAN frames in a CAN
protocol. At the uniform level of the source code, we executed
the same program before and after all the transmissions in
the source ECU. Whereas, at the heterogeneous level, we
executed a randomly picked source code from amongst a suite
of mibench source code [31] before and after the transmissions
in the source ECU.
We identified the critical interaction between factors and the
corresponding levels using fractional factorial design analysis
[32]. Based on the analysis of variance experiment, four of
the 25 interactions are reported as most significant. Using
the significant interactions in the lab setup, we conducted
the experiments in the lab setup. For every experiment, we
captured and decoded 5 k transmissions. For the decoded trans-
missions, we constructed features of transmissions using the
proposed approach III-B1 for all the source addresses mapped
to the ECUs across all the experiments. We trained, cross-
validated and evaluated the SVMs for each of the experiments
using the train, cross-validation and test set of power traces.
Figure 7 shows the results of classification. Results show
that the proposed technique is more accurate with simple bus
configuration (125 kbps bus speed, Standard Format, Uniform
Source Code) than with advanced configurations (500 kbps
bus speed, Extended Format, Heterogeneous Source Code).
However, the subtle difference between the accuracy of the
two extreme network configurations shows that the impact of
the variations of the factors has a negligible effect on the state
classification accuracy of the ECU. And hence, the proposed
approach can be applied to practical settings without worrying
about the impact of small and frequent changes in the bus
properties.
VI. DISCUSSION
We use non-clonable characteristics of the transmission to
develop a sender authentication technique. An important and
unique advantage of our proposed technique is that CANOA
relies on truly non-clonable characteristics of the transmitter.
Previous works based on physical characteristics rely on
attributes of the transmitted signal, which in principle can
be imitated. In our case, we rely on physical attributes of
the transmitter. This means that under the assumption that
CANOA’s implementation is secure and tamper-proof, then
even with unrestricted physical access to the CAN bus, an
attacker is still physically unable to defeat CANOA.
A. Applications
The applicability of CANOA is not limited to CAN protocol
but to many other communication protocols with similar
properties, notably, lack of and difficulty to incorporate sender
authentication mechanisms. In particular, CANOA can also
be used with a more refined version of CAN protocols such
as FlexRay, TTCAN, CAN-FD, CANopen, and SafetyBUS.
Moreover, the fact that these protocols are next-generation
protocols implies that CANOA applies to future generation
automobile systems as well.
B. Future Work
Avenues for future work on CANOA include improvement
of the technique in its current form as well as extending
the idea for a more flexible and generalizable sender au-
thentication mechanism. In the current implementation of
CANOA, we use the power consumption measurements from
the ECUs for sender authentication. An interesting extension to
CANOA would be to use the power consumption of the entire
system instead to isolate the transmitting ECU. The approach
helps reduce the number of hardware interfaces to monitor
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Fig. 7. Figure shows the impact of variation in the bus speed, CAN frame format, and source code on the accuracy of CANOA. For each combination of
the experimental factors, the subplots show the metrics of accuracy, precision, recall, and F-measure.
power consumption measurements from ECUs as well as the
computational complexity. Furthermore, as CANOA relies on
the verdict of the model to report the true state of any ECU, it
is essential to determine what aspects of the input power traces
triggers the model to conclude. An interesting future work as
an enhancement of the proposed technique is to unravel the
root cause of the model output.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel technique for sender
authentication using power consumption measurements of the
ECUs. The capability of the power trace based method to
accurately determine the transmitting state of the ECUs result
in accurate sender identification. We showed that the approach
can be used to detect the presence of compromised and
additional devices on the network. Evaluation of the approach
against a lab setup and a practical setting showed that the
technique is highly effective with a false positive rate of
0.002%. We also showed that the approach applies to different
network settings without compromising on the accuracy.
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